Security metadata and runtime scanning
Our carriers install packages into your image; they are not deployed services. We do not generate carrier SBOMs or copy one into consumers. An archive inventory would omit your application and could list subpackages you never installed.
Scan the final image
Keep the native APK database, /lib/apk/db/installed, and scan the completed
application image by digest:
syft registry.example/app@sha256:<digest> -o cyclonedx-json > app.cdx.json
trivy image --format cyclonedx --output app.trivy.cdx.json registry.example/app@sha256:<digest>
trivy image registry.example/app@sha256:<digest>
Syft generates inventory; Trivy's image command can inventory and scan. Preserve scanner-specific metadata when passing an SBOM to another tool; importing a generic SBOM can change vulnerability matching. APK version detection does not guarantee correct vulnerability matching for custom builds: Alpine's advisory revisions are about Alpine's packages. Check upstream release/advisory evidence too.
For Java, scan application JARs as well as the JDK. For Kubernetes reporting, associate each running pod/container's resolved image digest with its final-image inventory. A carrier digest cannot identify which application images or pods installed its packages. Cluster inventory/UI belongs in consumer infrastructure, not this package build pipeline.
Release evidence
/metadata/release.json records exact APK/source SHA-256 hashes, native names,
versions, architectures, dependencies and version-specific security references.
BuildKit publication also requests minimal provenance. Neither is a vulnerability
scan or a claim that post-publication tests passed.
Each recipe's security.json has version, status, advisories and references.
Statuses are security, maintenance or unknown; reviewed classifications need
upstream HTTPS evidence. Missing evidence stays unknown. Updates reset the status
when the version changes.